In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing (...) the forgotten action does not. We argue that this result has important implications for a long-running debate about the nature of responsible agency. (shrink)

This study assessed external debts and the financing of education in Nigeria using time series data obtained from World Bank, and CBN Statistical Bulletin covering a period of 31 years from 1988 -2018. The model of the study was derived, while the data collected were analysed using the Ordinary Least Squares. Diagnostic tests such as Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) unit root test, Johansen co-integration, Vector Error Correction (VEC) techniques of estimation, and Granger Causality tests were all performed. Findings revealed a (...) significant long-run relationship between external debts and the financing of education; external debts have a significant effect (F=39.07055, p<.05) on the financing of education in Nigeria; external debt stock and external debt service payment have no significant effect on the financing of education; real GDP and Exchange rate have a significant effect on the financing of education in Nigeria respectively. Based on these findings, it was concluded that external debt is a big hindrance to the financing of education and consequently, the economic growth of Nigeria. It was recommended amongst others that the government should use borrowed funds from external sources for productive capital projects or development initiatives such as investment in education and the eradication of illiteracy. (shrink)

Internodons are a formalization of Hennig's concept of species. We present an alternative construction of internodons imposing a tree structure on the genealogical network. We prove that the segments (trivial unary trees) from this tree structure are precisely the internodons. We obtain the following spin-offs. First, the generated tree turns out to be an organismal tree of life. Second, this organismal tree is homeomorphic to the phylogenetic Hennigian species tree of life, implying the discovery of a multi-level tree of life: (...) this phylogenetic tree can be obtained by zooming out from the organismal tree, or conversely, the organismal tree of life can be generated by expanding the phylogenetic nodes into unary trees. Finally, the definition of the organismal tree allows an efficient algorithmic transformation of a given genealogical network into its corresponding phylogenetic species tree of life. The latter will be presented in a separate paper. (shrink)

The epistemic theory of causality views causality as a tool that helps us to predict, explain and control our world, rather than as a relation that exists independently of our epistemic practices. In this chapter, we first provide an introduction to the epistemic theory of causality. We then outline four considerations that motivate the epistemic theory: the failure of standard theories of causality; parsimony; the epistemology of causality; and neutrality. We illustrate these four considerations in the contexts of the social (...) sciences and the cognitive sciences. We argue that the epistemic theory provides a very natural account of causality across these contexts. (shrink)

According to a common caricature of Kant’s ethics, it is synonymous with the Categorical Imperative (CI) and with the sublime and clarion call of duty. But in this paper, I argue that the conjunction of Kant’s concept of duty and his idea of morality as a system of imperatives is unsustainable on the grounds that it commits him to the following two theses: (I) If an agent has a duty to D, then she must be constrained to D, and (II) (...) the Supreme Law of Morality always manifests in the form of duty for humans. I begin by examining (and rejecting) various attempts to defend these two theses. I then explore how this bears on various central aspects of Kant's thought including “ought implies can” (OIC), “ought implies able not to” (OIAN), his system of duties, and the nature of respect. (shrink)

We argue that C. Darwin and more recently W. Hennig worked at times under the simplifying assumption of an eternal biosphere. So motivated, we explicitly consider the consequences which follow mathematically from this assumption, and the infinite graphs it leads to. This assumption admits certain clusters of organisms which have some ideal theoretical properties of species, shining some light onto the species problem. We prove a dualization of a law of T.A. Knight and C. Darwin, and sketch a decomposition result (...) involving the internodons of D. Kornet, J. Metz and H. Schellinx. A further goal of this paper is to respond to B. Sturmfels’ question, “Can biology lead to new theorems?”. (shrink)

A fundamental question asked in modal logic is whether a given theory is consistent. But consistent with what? A typical way to address this question identifies a choice of background knowledge axioms (say, S4, D, etc.) and then shows the assumptions codified by the theory in question to be consistent with those background axioms. But determining the specific choice and division of background axioms is, at least sometimes, little more than tradition. This paper introduces generic theories for propositional modal logic (...) to address consistency results in a more robust way. As building blocks for background knowledge, generic theories provide a standard for categorical determinations of consistency. We argue that the results and methods of this paper help to elucidate problems in epistemology and enjoy sufficient scope and power to have purchase on problems bearing on modalities in judgement, inference, and decision making. (shrink)

In this paper, I answer the following question: suppose that two individuals, C and D, have been in a long-term committed relationship, and D now has dementia, while C is competent; if D agrees to have sex with C, is it permissible for C to have sex with D? Ultimately, I defend the view that, under certain conditions, D can give valid consent to sex with C, rendering sex between them permissible. Specifically, I argue there is compelling reason to endorse (...) the following thesis: -/- Prior Consent Thesis: D, when competent, can give valid prior consent to sex with her competent partner (C) that will take place after she has dementia, assuming that D is the same person as she was when she gave prior consent, meaning that, if D, when competent, gave prior consent to sex with C, then C may permissibly have sex with D. In section I, I explain both the background and the existing literature on this issue. In section II, I outline relevant stipulations about the kinds of cases I will be examining. In section III, I defend the Prior Consent Thesis. And, in section IV, I address objections to the Prior Consent Thesis. (shrink)

Samuel Buchoul, dans « Homo Scribens : vers une bio-graphie qui ne recherche plus rien », cherche à articuler écriture et vie en se demandant pourquoi la vie écrit-elle. Dès lors que les concepts de biographie et de biologie s’entrelacent tout au long de La vie la mort, Buchoul interroge le concept derridien d’écriture à travers l’étude croisée de Jacob, Heidegger, Nietzsche et Freud, et le relit à la lumière de quelques arguments de Jean-Paul Sartre et de Bernard Stiegler. (...) Son analyse débouche sur l’hypothèse d’une liaison conceptuelle aussi bien qu’historique entre la pratique de l’écriture et la condition existentielle de l’homme. (shrink)

Drunken sex is common. Despite how common drunken sex is, we think very uncritically about it. In this paper, I want to examine whether drunk individuals can consent to sex. Specifically, I answer this question: suppose that an individual, D, who is drunk but can still engage in reasoning and communication, agrees to have sex with a sober individual, S; is D’s consent to sex with S morally valid? I will argue that, within a certain range of intoxication, an individual (...) who is drunk can give valid consent to have sex with an individual who is sober. (shrink)

En général, un agent peut dire ce qu’il est en train de faire sans l’observer au préalable, et il possède une certaine autorité sur ce qu’il en dit. Partant de ce fait, Elizabeth Anscombe a soutenu que la connaissance qu’un agent a de ses actions intentionnelles est un «savoir pratique» (practical knowledge) «sans observation». Cette thèse a été abondamment commentée, critiquée et reprise depuis la publication d’Intention il y a bientôt 70 ans. Ce qui a plus rarement été abordé est (...) l’étonnant parallèle entre ce que dit Anscombe à ce sujet, et certaines descriptions sartriennes de la conscience d’un agent intentionnel. Cet article tâchera de montrer que les pensées respectives de ce drôle de couple philosophique convergent sur l’idée que nous avons la capacité de dire ce que nous sommes en train de faire sans observation ni réflexion préalable. En critiquant une certaine image de l’intériorité de l'esprit, leur objectif commun est de rendre compte de cette conscience de soi toute particulière qui permet aux agents de savoir ce qu’ils font dans et par cette action même. Comment faut-il comprendre le rapport entre ces deux approches ? Sont-elles complémentaires ? Concurrentes ? Nous considérons qu’une réponse simple et tranchée à ces questions n’est pas possible d’avance, exige une étude comparative relativement poussée. Notre hypothèse est que le savoir pratique d’un agent est indissociable d’une certaine expérience de l’engagement pratique dans le monde que décrit Sartre. (shrink)

How do we know ourselves? When it comes to our states of mind, it might seem that self-knowledge enjoys a privilege: I know what I'm thinking because I have immediate access to my mind. Inspired by Sartre, two American philosophers, Richard Moran and Charles Larmore, have argued that this idea fails to account for our singular relationship with our own minds. In addition to knowing ourselves through theoretical reflection, we are also capable of practical reflection. We can answer the question (...) of what we think in a practical way: through a decision or a commitment, rather than a self-interpretation. But what is the relationship between these two types of self-reflection? What should we do when they conflict? This book seeks to answer these questions. In so doing, it shows the importance of another path to self-knowledge hitherto left aside by analytic authors: phenomenological reflection on our experience of the world. -/- Comment se connaît-on soi-même ? Concernant nos états d’esprit, il peut sembler que la connaissance de soi jouisse d’un privilège : je sais ce que je pense parce que j’ai un accès immédiat à mon esprit. S’inspirant de Sartre, deux philosophes américains, Richard Moran et Charles Larmore, ont soutenu que cette idée ne rend pas compte de notre rapport singulier à notre propre esprit. En plus de se connaître par une réflexion théorique, on est aussi capable d’une réflexion pratique. On peut répondre de façon pratique à la question de savoir ce qu’on pense : par une décision ou un engagement, plutôt qu’une interprétation de soi. Mais quel est le rapport entre ces deux types de réflexion sur soi ? Que faire lorsqu’elles entrent en conflit ? Ce livre cherche à répondre à ces questions. Ce faisant, il montre l’importance d’une autre voie vers la connaissance de soi jusqu’à présent laissée de côté par les auteurs analytiques : la réflexion phénoménologique sur notre expérience du monde. (shrink)

This volume, a lightly-edited version of Professor Samuel Scolnicov’s 1974 Ph.D. thesis, is a fitting tribute to his impressive career. It will perhaps be most useful for those interested in better understanding Scolnicov’s work and his views on Plato as a whole, not least for the comprehensive list of his publications that requires a full twelve pages of print. Scholars with an interest in Plato’s method of hypothesis will also find some useful remarks on key passages in the Meno, (...) Phaedo, and Republic as well as on Greek mathematical analysis.Illuminating other aspects of Scolnicov’s work is clearly part of the intention behind enabling broader access to this study. As Harold Tarrant notes in his introduction... (shrink)

Cette contribution propose une analyse comparée de la manière dont Bernard de Fontenelle, pour l’Académie des sciences de Paris, et Samuel Formey, pour l’Académie des sciences et des belles-lettres de Berlin, théorisent le rôle et le mode de fonctionnement des académies, ainsi que leur inscription dans la catégorie générale d’histoire de l’esprit humain. Cela permet de montrer comment leur fonction épistémologique est en étroite relation avec le statut politique qui leur est conféré.

Cette contribution propose une analyse comparée de la manière dont Bernard de Fontenelle, pour l’Académie des sciences de Paris, et Samuel Formey, pour l’Académie des sciences et des belles-lettres de Berlin, théorisent le rôle et le mode de fonctionnement des académies, ainsi que leur inscription dans la catégorie générale d’histoire de l’esprit humain. Cela permet de montrer comment leur fonction épistémologique est en étroite relation avec le statut politique qui leur est conféré.

This is the report on the XVI BRAZILIAN LOGIC CONFERENCE (EBL 2011) held in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between May 9–13, 2011 published in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 18, Number 1, March 2012. -/- The 16th Brazilian Logic Conference (EBL 2011) was held in Petro ́polis, from May 9th to 13th, 2011, at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC). It was the sixteenth in a series of conferences that started in 1977 with the aim of (...) congregating logicians from Brazil and abroad, furthering interest in logic and its applications, stimulating cooperation, and contributing to the development of this branch of science. EBL 2011 included more than one-hundred and fifty participants, all of them belonging to prominent research institutes from Brazil and abroad, especially Latin America. The conference was sponsored by the Academia Brasileira de Ciências (ABC), the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic (ASL), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Sciences (CLE), Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC), Pontif ́ıcia Universidade Cato ́lica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC- Rio), Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Funding was provided by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient ́ıfico e Tecnolo ́ gico (CNPq), Fundac ̧a ̃o de Amparo `a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), Fundação Euclides da Cunha (FEC), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The members of the Scientific Committee were: Mário Folhadela Benevides (COPPE- UFRJ), Fa ́bio Bertato (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Jean-Yves Béziau (UFRJ), Ricardo Bianconi (USP), Juliana Bueno-Soler (UFABC), Xavier Caicedo (Universidad de Los An- des), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio), Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Newton da Costa (UFSC, President), Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa (UFRG), Alexandre Costa-Leite (UnB), I ́tala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Marcelo Finger (USP), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC-Rio), Décio Krause (UFSC), João Marcos (UFRN), Ana Teresa de Castro Martins (UFC), Maria da Paz Nunes de Medeiros (UFRN), Francisco Miraglia (USP), Luiz Car- los Pereira (PUC-Rio and UFRJ), Elaine Pimentel (UFMG), and Samuel Gomes da Silva (UFBA). The members of the Organizing Committee were: Anderson de Araujo (UNICAMP), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio, Co- chair), Marcelo Correa (UFF), Renata de Freitas (UFF), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC- RJ), Hugo Nobrega (COPPE-UFRJ), Luiz Carlos Pereira (PUC-Rio e IFCS/UFRJ), Leandro Suguitani (UNICAMP), Rafael Testa (UNICAMP), Leonardo Bruno Vana (UFF), and Petrucio Viana (UFF, Co-chair). (shrink)

L'écologie préénergétique des années 1905-1935 est à la recherche de ses objets d'étude. Des unités fondamentales de la nature (telles que formation végétale, association végétale, climax, biome, communauté biotique, écosystème) se trouvent en compétition et se succèdent les unes aux autres. Autour des années 1920 et 1930, la philosophie organiciste d'Alfred N. Whitehead, ainsi que la perspective évolutionniste d'Herbert Spencer et les propositions émergentistes de Samuel Alexander et Conwy L. Morgan, deviennent des références sous-jacentes au débat épistémologique concernant les (...) unités de base de l'écologie. Des auteurs comme Frederic E. Clements et John Phillips soutiendront plusieurs formes d'organicisme écologique, tandis que Henry A. Gleason interprétera l'association végétale comme le résultat d'une juxtaposition fortuite d'individus. Enfin, et paradoxalement, l'écosystème de Arthur G. Tansley, tout en faisant partie, à l'origine, d'une perspective anti-organiciste, deviendra l'unité fondamentale de programmes de recherche qui se voudront, au moins dans leurs intentions, émergentistes. (shrink)

Le but de ce recueil est d’offrir des commentaires accessibles et introductifs aux textes classiques qu’ils accompagnent, en ouvrant des perspectives de discussion sur le thème du capitalisme. C’est en ce sens qu’Emmanuel Chaput lance le débat en commentant le texte de Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, « Qu’est-ce que la propriété ? ». Les textes de Karl Marx ne sont bien sûr pas laissés pour compte : Samuel-Élie Lesage s’engage fermement dans cette voie en discutant L’idéologie allemande de Karl Marx, Christiane (...) Bailey nous offre d’approcher différemment l’œuvre marxienne en abordant son traitement de la question animale dans des extraits du Manifeste du parti communiste et du Travail salarié et capital, et Mathieu Joffre-Lainé nous présente une analyse fine des questions proprement économiques du Capital. Abordant les alternatives au capitalisme dans la pensée de Léon Bourgeois, Éliot Litalien commente La Solidarité et Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette s’attaque à l’analyse de l’Essai d’une philosophie de la solidarité. Enfin, en liant capitalisme, patriarcat et pouvoir politique, Tara Chanady propose une lecture du texte Du mariage et de l’amour de Emma Goldman. La conclusion de Marie-Eve Jalbert se situe dans une perspective contemporaine et critique en décortiquant la critique du socialisme avancée par Friedrich A. Hayek. (shrink)

MUDANÇAS, REVOLUÇÕES E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES -/- CHANGES, REVOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE - [email protected] / [email protected] e WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- PREMISSA -/- A mudança social é um tema presente na Sociologia desde o seu início. Seria possível dizer que o surgimento da Sociologia está vinculado à discussão sobre as transformações sociais, ou seja, falar sobre a ciência da sociedade é falar sobre esse tema. Por isso mesmo, abordar o tema da (...) mudança social pressupõe lidar com a questão das resistências às possíveis transformações. Quando uma comunidade ou uma sociedade se depara com mudanças, de origem interna ou externa, há sempre resistência, pois há uma espécie de acomodação ao que já existe. Assim, as relações de poder, por exemplo, podem se modificar, num complexo jogo de resistência contra o poder e desejo de conquistá-lo ou ampliá-lo. Desse modo, confrontos e conflitos compõem o itinerário das mudanças e revoluções sociais. -/- Aqui serão objetos de análise dois grandes tipos de mudanças sociais: aquelas que, por seu caráter universal e multifacetado, afetaram toda a humanidade e aquelas de conotação sociopolítica, que atingiram determinadas sociedades e, depois, tornaram-se referência para outras mudanças. Serão, portanto, abordadas as revoluções agrícola e industrial e as recentes transformações e os episódios mais marcantes das revoluções políticas contemporâneas em todo o mundo. -/- A REVOLUÇÃO AGRÍCOLA -/- Esta revolução transformou radicalmente a forma de produção de alimentos das populações humanas. A expressão “revolução agrícola” foi criada pelo arqueólogo australiano Gordon Childe (1892-1957). Ela também é chamada de “revolução do Neolítico”, pois foi o período em que a humanidade desenvolveu a agricultura e as técnicas de cultivo de alimentos, como também aprendeu a domesticar e criar animais. Isso alterou o processo de obtenção de alimentos, pois as populações deixaram de ser coletoras e caçadoras e passaram, paulatinamente, a ter uma relação diferenciada com animais e plantas. Essas mudanças não ocorreram ao mesmo tempo em todos os lugares. Elas se iniciaram no Oriente Médio (há 9 ou 10 mil anos). Depois, no Egito (9 mil), na Índia (8 mil), na China (7 mil), na Europa (6,5 mil), na África tropical (5 mil) e na América, principalmente no México e no Peru (4,5 mil anos), através do deslocamento de hordas humanas ou movimentos independentes. O processo foi muito longo. Inicialmente, percebeu-se que os grãos que eram coletados para alimentação poderiam ser enterrados, isto é, “semeados”, a fim de produzir novas plantas iguais às que eram coletadas anteriormente. Assim, foi possível produzir trigo, cevada, milho, arroz e tubérculos (vários tipos de batatas); posteriormente, também árvores frutíferas. A partir de então, em consequência da experiência e da observação do que acontecia no meio ambiente, passou-se a selecionar sementes e outras árvores para plantio. Através da experiência prática, desenvolveu-se um conhecimento dos diferentes tipos de solo e de plantas, o que ajudou a aprimorar as técnicas de plantio e colheita, incluindo a observação da melhor época para o desenvolvimento de cada uma das culturas. Determinante para a fixação de grupos humanos (sedentarização) há milhares de anos, a agricultura ainda é a principal atividade de parte expressiva da população mundial. Essa atividade é a eminente na questão de desenvolvimento do Brasil, uma vez que o setor a cada ano emprega mais, a cada ano produz mais e a cada ano supera os índices de lucratividade anteriores, sendo, por fim, o baú do tesouro brasileiro. Voltando para a Revolução, outro elemento essencial desse processo foi a domesticação de animais. Junto com a agricultura, esse foi um passo muito importante para a alteração do modo de vida da humanidade, já que eliminou a necessidade do deslocamento para obtenção da carne e das peles necessárias ao conforto e também do leite dos rebanhos. A domesticação deve ter surgido espontaneamente em vários locais, resultado do processo de aproximação e observação dos animais no decurso das caçadas. O primeiro animal domesticado foi o cão; na sequência, animais para a alimentação e tração, como a cabra, o carneiro, o boi e o cavalo. Paralelamente a essas mudanças, alguns instrumentos foram sendo confeccionados, como a foice, o arado, a roda e outros que eram utilizados para arar a terra e até na colheita: novas tecnologias para um processo revolucionário. Esse processo intenso de subdivisões e deslocamentos provocou uma onda de difusão da agricultura e da atividade pastoril através das migrações. Imagine-se por um momento vivendo em grupos ou fazendo parte de hordas humanas, reproduzindo-se e subdividindo-se, migrando para outros locais, plantando e desenvolvendo a criação de animais em vários lugares, deslocando-se à procura de novos espaços e invadindo territórios de outros grupos, convivendo entre si ou em conflito, aprendendo e ensinando aos grupos com os quais estabeleceram alguma comunicação e submetendo-se ou sendo submetidos pelos habitantes com quem entraram em contato. Esse é apenas um pequeno esboço do que ocorreu nesse processo de transmissão e absorção de novas formas revolucionárias de viver. A grande revolução agrícola (que foi, em essência, a síntese de centenas de revoluções localizadas no tempo e no espaço e marcadas pela diversidade de ações e resultados) foi aquela que alterou de fato e profundamente toda a humanidade. Mas ela continua até hoje, uma vez que as transformações que ocorrem na produção de alimentos não estacionaram e mantêm um processo de mudança contínuo. Entretanto, existem ainda formas de organização social, como a de alguns poucos povos caçadores e coletores, que utilizam a agricultura e a domesticação de animais à moda antiga. -/- A REVOLUÇÃO INDUSTRIAL -/- O que se chama de Revolução Industrial na Europa nos séculos XVIII e XIX não é uma revolução puramente industrial, nem começou repentinamente nesses séculos. Foi um processo lento de transformação que se desenvolveu desde o século XV e atingiu grandes setores da produção, como o mineiro, o metalúrgico e o têxtil. A expansão da produção nesses setores envolveu a invenção de novas técnicas e máquinas, além de uma estrutura (a fábrica) que permitisse a concentração de equipamentos e trabalhadores num só lugar. Situadas quase sempre nas cidades, as fábricas requeriam muita mão de obra. Atraindo as pessoas que deixavam o campo em busca de trabalho, as cidades cresceram vertiginosamente. Transformava-se, assim, a forma de produzir bens e serviços, alterando as formas de viver e revolucionando as relações sociais. Mas isso não aconteceu de maneira uniforme no mundo todo. Para que se tenha ideia da multiplicidade das mudanças trazidas pela urbanização e pela industrialização, a Inglaterra conheceu esses fenômenos típicos da modernidade em torno de 1860; o Brasil, por volta da década de 1930; a China, a partir do final do século XX. A Revolução Industrial começou no setor têxtil, na produção da lã e do algodão, com o uso das máquinas de fiar conhecidas como Spinning Jenny (1764) e Spinning Mule (1789), inventadas, respectivamente, por James Hargreaves e Samuel Crompton. Nessa época, a produção era feita manualmente, com rocas de baixíssimo rendimento. Pode-se dizer que, paralelamente à Revolução Industrial, houve na Europa uma segunda revolução agrícola. Ela teve início com a mudança na estrutura da propriedade rural, quando os proprietários de terras se juntaram a ricos comerciantes das cidades interessados em investir na agricultura e promoveram a introdução de novas técnicas de cultivo, entre as quais a rotação de culturas sem pousio (parcela de terras em repouso), de forma a retirar o máximo proveito das terras; a drenagem de terras pantanosas; o abate de florestas; e a ocupação de terras comunais. No intuito de melhorar a produção, promoveram a seleção das espécies mais produtivas, de sementes e o apuramento dos melhores rebanhos. Além disso, foram introduzidas máquinas e houve melhora nos transportes no espaço agrário. Isso permitiu relativa abundância em produtos agrícolas essenciais (carne, leite e derivados, legumes, tubérculos, cereais etc.), que juntamente com a indústria extrativa do sal, indispensável para a conservação dos alimentos, propiciou a melhoria gradual na dieta alimentar. Essas mudanças e a diminuição crescente da mortalidade propiciaram o que se pode chamar de revolução demográfica. Para se ter uma ideia, na Inglaterra, onde a Revolução teve início, a população em 1750 era de 6,5 milhões; em 1801 passou a 16,3 milhões e, em 1851, somava 27,5 milhões. Isso exigiu um aumento da produção e de matérias-primas vegetais e animais (transformadas nas fábricas). No século XIX, outras transformações ocorreram em face da emergência de novas fontes energéticas (eletricidade e petróleo) e de novos ramos industriais, o que resultou em alteração profunda nos processos produtivos, com a introdução de novas máquinas e equipamentos. Todas essas transformações propiciaram mudanças nas comunicações (telégrafo e telefone), nos meios de transporte (navio e trem a vapor, automóvel) e também em todas as esferas da vida (familiar, educacional, jurídica, governamental etc.). Além disso, provocaram o surgimento de inovações na arte, na literatura e nas ciências. -/- AS REVOLUÇÕES CONTEMPORÂNEAS -/- Há uma grande transformação em curso nas sociedades humanas. Os grandes artífices dessas mudanças cada vez mais radicais são as inovações tecnológicas e os resultados alcançados pela evolução dos processos científicos. É difícil demarcar espaços que estejam imunes a essa era de revoluções múltiplas e de largo alcance: de algum modo, todas as culturas estão imersas nessa nova fase da aldeia global, em que tudo e todos parecem estar condenados à interconexão e às novas realidades na microeletrônica, na genética de laboratório e na nanotecnologia, para citar apenas alguns dos “admiráveis mundos novos”. A microeletrônica revolucionou a escala produtiva de bens e serviços mediante o desenvolvimento de sistemas computacionais. Provocou uma mudança significativa também nos meios de comunicação. O uso de celulares, smartphones, computadores pessoais e portáteis, tablets e outros tantos equipamentos está alterando a forma de as pessoas e organizações públicas e privadas se comunicarem e se estruturarem. Novos componentes eletrônicos produzidos com base na nanotecnologia poderão revolucionar o que hoje conhecemos por computação, permitindo a produção de computadores pessoais com muitos processadores, extremamente rápidos e com enorme capacidade de armazenamento. No futuro, os nanoprocessadores provavelmente estarão presentes na maioria dos objetos que utilizaremos. Por meio da microeletrônica e da nanotecnologia, o nível de desenvolvimento da bioengenharia (ou engenharia genética) beirará a ficção científica. A manipulação genética, com o aprofundamento do conhecimento do DNA humano, de plantas e animais, será ampliada. As pesquisas mais divulgadas nessa área se referem às possibilidades de intervenção no campo da Medicina, como as vinculadas à utilização de células-tronco, à produção de vacinas e medicamentos específicos, à produção sintética de elementos essenciais à saúde humana (como a insulina e a albumina), à análise genética das doenças e à consequente terapia gênica, aos transplantes, ao mapeamento genético dos indivíduos, à formação de bancos de genoma de espécies em extinção, à recuperação de DNA de espécies extintas e até à clonagem de animais. Essas transformações podem gerar, entretanto, novos desafios e suscitar questões atreladas, por exemplo, à privacidade dos indivíduos, ao acesso desigual à tecnologia, aos riscos ambientais (aos seres vivos, incluindo os humanos), às relações sociais e de trabalho, às mudanças de valores e normas sociais e, principalmente, às possibilidades de maior liberdade e igualdade ou maior opressão/controle, além de maior ou menor desigualdade social. A Sociologia, que, como vimos, nasceu na Europa no contexto de grandes transformações, propõe debates sobre essas novas tecnologias e as mudanças sociais provocadas pelo uso delas. São necessários novos olhares, novos conceitos e teorias para dar conta desses elementos que estão afetando a vida humana em todos os sentidos. A utilização de novos saberes e tecnologias alterará a pesquisa em todas as ciências, permitindo mais aprofundamento, através de novos equipamentos, com modificações sensíveis nos modos de conhecer o mundo. A aplicação e o desenvolvimento científicos exercerão impacto na maioria das indústrias existentes, em áreas como as de sistemas de construção, transportes, comunicações, maquinário agrícola, e, é claro, na prestação de serviços. Será possível fabricar materiais cem vezes mais resistentes que o aço, carros cuja lataria não estará sujeita a riscos, espelhos antiofuscantes, aviões mais leves, jornais eletrônicos de plástico semelhante ao papel, tintas que mudam de cor etc. No cotidiano, roupas que não amassam ou que não cheiram mesmo depois de absorver muito suor poderão ser compradas em supermercados; do mesmo modo, tecidos que controlam a temperatura do corpo, adaptando-o confortavelmente à temperatura do ar, serão vendidos a preços acessíveis em toda parte, ao lado de vestimentas que auxiliam no emagrecimento e em diversas atividades orientadas por médicos e profissionais de saúde e esporte. O futuro, então, logo trará roupas impermeáveis, inodoras e que não mancham, as chamadas roupas interativas. Esses são exemplos simples do que já existe, mas ainda não em escala industrial para consumo massivo. A presença de robôs no processo produtivo já é uma realidade insofismável e pode-se prever que em pouco tempo eles farão serviços domésticos e outras várias atividades que hoje são desenvolvidas por pessoas de carne, osso e alma. Veículos autônomos, ou os automóveis que andam sozinhos, estão sendo desenvolvidos e alguns já são utilizados para a alegria e o espanto de muita gente. Na área ambiental, a revolução tecnológica poderá ocorrer em muitos campos. Ganharão muita visibilidade o uso de materiais alternativos e a utilização do que hoje chamamos de resíduos industriais ou domésticos na fabricação de mercadorias. Todos esses resíduos, que hoje são descartados, inclusive os chamados não recicláveis, podem passar a ser matérias-primas para diferentes setores da economia. A máxima de Lavoisier (1743-1794) seria então plenamente consagrada: Na natureza nada se cria, nada se perde, tudo se transforma. Nem tudo são flores, entretanto. Acesso desigual aos frutos dessas mudanças; prejuízos ao meio ambiente (riscos aos seres vivos, incluindo os humanos), às relações sociais e de trabalho, aos valores e normas sociais e, principalmente, às possibilidades de maior liberdade e igualdade ou mais opressão e controle, além de maiores ou menores desigualdades sociais. Um conjunto de situações novas para as quais ainda não se tem respostas pode surgir da expansão tecnológica e do desenvolvimento da ciência. Assim como a energia atômica trouxe benefícios extraordinários e malefícios estarrecedores à humanidade, novas tecnologias e inovadores processos científicos poderão trazer grandes soluções e reviravoltas nas formas de ser e de viver, bem como enormes e imprevisíveis prejuízos e destruições. -/- BREVE CONCLUSÃO -/- As revoluções do passado e do presente se estenderão ainda por muito tempo, uma vez que são expressões da atividade humana, a qual transforma o meio e é por ele transformada. Não há transformações que não retenham algo do passado e, ao mesmo tempo, delineiem alguns traços do futuro, pois as mudanças, por mais radicais que sejam, sempre conservam algo. Além disso elas não ocorrem em todos os lugares nem atingem a todos da mesma forma, deixando abertas as portas da história. Essa imprevisibilidade da ação humana, calcada no tempo anterior e orientada para os dias posteriores, dá graça e mistério à existência, tornando a vida em sociedade um desafio de conquistas fabulosas e um palco de derrotas lampejantes. -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- ALMOND, M.; BATISTA, G. O livro de ouro das Revoluções. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2018. -/- TOMAZI, N. D.; ROSSI, M. A. Sociologia para o ensino médio. Vol. Único. 5ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2016. -/- Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva © 2019 Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- . (shrink)

Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679- 1749) fu poetessa, drammaturga e filosofa. La vivacità intellettuale e la forte determinazione le permisero di aggirare il pregiudizio di genere e di sottrarsi alle dinamiche di marginalizzazione femminile tipiche dell’età moderna. Pur celandosi dietro l’anonimato, Cockburn prese parte attiva al dibattito filosofico del tempo, intervenendo soprattutto in materia di morale. Le sue opere filosofiche, scritte in difesa di Locke o di Clarke, custodiscono, nonostante il dichiarato intento apologetico, tratti di originalità e indipendenza, particolarmente evidenti nella (...) teoria dell’obbligo morale, nell’interpretazione modale della dottrina lockeana d’identità personale, nell’ipotesi di una natura ontologica dello spazio. (shrink)

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology’s transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument — the Problem of Power-Seeking — claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pursuit of their goals. We review reasons for thinking that AI systems might seek power, that (...) they might obtain it, that this could lead to catastrophe, and that we might build and deploy such systems anyway. The second argument claims that the development of human-level AI will unlock rapid further progress, culminating in AI systems far more capable than any human — this is the Singularity Hypothesis. Power-seeking behavior on the part of such systems might be particularly dangerous. We discuss a variety of objections to both arguments and conclude by assessing the state of the debate. (shrink)

This month, the AISDL Team was glad to see its continuing effort to raise the voice for conserving wildlife appearing in Pacific Conservation Biology (published by CSIRO/the Australian Academy of Science). The article stipulates the need for weaving humane values with scientific information, leveraging the sociocultural power to harmonize humans with nature. The article articulates the coauthors’ idea of building a funding source to contribute to the nature conservation cause by investing in some listed stocks. Technically, stocks we intend to (...) invest in must possess some key features of (i) having significant growth potential, (ii) containing little environmental risk of potential moral-practical gaps in their CSR missions, and (iii) showing a certain degree of “relevance” with AISDL’s fundamentals. (shrink)

Trong thế giới cạnh tranh thời đại số (“digital”), phương tiện kỹ thuật cung cấp nhiều thuận lợi cho việc sản xuất nội dung. Tuy thế, sự phong phú nội dung và đầu tư cho xúc tiến, tiếp thị gia tăng cũng lại khiến cho quá trình cạnh tranh tìm một chỗ đứng cho sản phẩm trở nên hết sức gian nan.Sản phẩm gần đây của nhóm nghiên cứu, chuyên khảo [1] của AISDL, ra đời sau những bài học gian (...) khó thu lượm được từ trước. Như thế, ý thức của mọi người về mức độ thách thức trong việc “chạm tới” người tiêu dùng. (shrink)

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In (...) this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non-deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles. (shrink)

This first piece of 2024 introduces some ideas concerning the role of non-linear thinking in today's fight against the climate crisis. More exactly, it is about the potential power of serendipity, artificial intelligence and the information deluge (that is causing headaches, too) when it comes to humankind's efforts to find solutions for the sake of surviving the paramount crisis.

According to data provided by CRAN, in November 2023, the number of downloads of the bayesvl program reached 293, showing an increase of +57.5% compared to the previous month.

Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic’s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring (...) with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal offers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative. (shrink)

Now it is plain that such consequences as these conflict sharply with common-sense notions of morality. If we had been obliged to accept Psychological Egoism, in any of its narrower forms, on its merits, we should have had to say: 'So much the worse for the common-sense notions of morality!' But, if I am right, the morality of common sense, with all its difficulties and incoherences, is immune at least to attacks from the basis of Psychological Egoism.

The use of the symbol ∨for disjunction in formal logic is ubiquitous. Where did it come from? The paper details the evolution of the symbol ∨ in its historical and logical context. Some sources say that disjunction in its use as connecting propositions or formulas was introduced by Peano; others suggest that it originated as an abbreviation of the Latin word for “or,” vel. We show that the origin of the symbol ∨ for disjunction can be traced to Whitehead and (...) Russell’s pre-Principia work in formal logic. Because of Principia’s influence, its notation was widely adopted by philosophers working in logic (the logical empiricists in the 1920s and 1930s, especially Carnap and early Quine). Hilbert’s adoption of ∨ in his Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik guaranteed its widespread use by mathematical logicians. The origins of other logical symbols are also discussed. (shrink)

Past research has found that the value of a person's activities can affect observers' judgments about whether that person is experiencing certain emotions (e.g., people consider morally good agents happier than morally bad agents). One proposed explanation for this effect is that emotion attributions are influenced by judgments about fittingness (whether the emotion is merited). Another hypothesis is that emotion attributions are influenced by judgments about the agent's true self (whether the emotion reflects how the agent feels “deep down”). We (...) tested these hypotheses in six studies. After finding that people think a wide range of emotions can be fitting and reflect a person's true self (Study 1), we tested the predictions of these two hypotheses for attributions of happiness, love, sadness, and hatred. We manipulated the emotions' fittingness (Studies 2a-b and 4) and whether the emotions reflected an agent's true self (Studies 3 and 5), measuring emotion attributions as well as fittingness judgments and true self judgments. The fittingness manipulation only impacted emotion attributions in the cases where it also impacted true self judgments, whereas the true self manipulation impacted emotion attribution in all cases, including those where it did not impact fittingness judgments. These results cast serious doubt on the fittingness hypothesis and offer some support for the true self hypothesis, which could be developed further in future work. -/- . (shrink)

Job motivation remains an area of concern among researchers due to the rising issues of poor or lack of motivation among workers. This refers to one’s personal will or drives to perform a task at work. Meanwhile, job satisfaction refers to an employee’s sense of fulfillment with his or her work experience. Therefore, the current study utilized the descriptive- correlational research design to investigate the impact of job motivation on the job satisfaction of accountants. To gather essential data and achieve (...) the objectives of the study, Multidimensional Work Motivational Scale (MWMS) and Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ) were administered to the target respondents. The collected data were then analyzed using a Multiple Regression Analysis; findings revealed that job motivation has a significant impact on the job satisfaction of accountants. Additionally, the results of this study were carefully evaluated and discussed, and recommendations were made to benefit the stakeholders of the study and contribute to the existing body of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the performance stories in the Zhuangzi, and the Butcher Ding story, emphasize an activity meditation practice that places the performer in a mindfulness flow zone, leading to graceful, efficacious, selfless, spontaneous, and free action. These stories are metaphors showing the reader how to attain a meditative state of focused awareness while acting freely in a flow experience. From my perspective, these metaphors are not about developing practical or technical skills per se. My argument challenges (...) a strict instrumental reading. Although instrumental reasoning can easily lead one to focus on the pragmatic outcomes depicted in these stories (See Eno, “Cook Ding’s Dao;” Callahan, “Cook Ding’s Life;” and Robins, “Beyond Skill”), the proposed pragmatic outcomes are merely a kind of collateral result of effortless, free actions, in the flow experience. The metaphors of Butcher Ding, the Lüliang rapids swimmer, the Wheelwright Bian, the Woodcarver Qing, the cicada catcher, the naked artist and so on are used to show the reader a way to engage in free and graceful action in the flow experience. Zhuangzi is not concerned about developing labour skills. He criticizes such skills; seen below when the Butcher claims to have “… left skill behind …” (進乎技矣) (Graham, Chuang-tzu, 63), and chapter five notes that “… skill is a peddler” (工為商) (Watson, Complete, 75). (shrink)

The natural evolution of consciousness in different animal species mandates that conscious experiences are causally potent in order to confer any advantage in the struggle for survival. Any endeavor to construct a physical theory of consciousness based on emergence within the framework of classical physics, however, leads to causally impotent conscious experiences in direct contradiction to evolutionary theory since epiphenomenal consciousness cannot evolve through natural selection. Here, we review recent theoretical advances in describing sentience and free will as fundamental aspects (...) of reality granted by quantum physical laws. Modern quantum information theory considers quantum states as a physical resource that endows quantum systems with the capacity to perform physical tasks that are classically impossible. Reductive identification of conscious experiences with the quantum information comprised in quantum brain states allows for causally potent consciousness that is capable of performing genuine choices for future courses of physical action. The consequent evolution of brain cortical networks contributes to increased computational power, memory capacity, and cognitive intelligence of the living organisms. (shrink)

Despite increased philosophical and psychological work on practical wisdom, contemporary interdisciplinary wisdom research provides few specifics about how to develop wisdom (Kristjánsson 2022). This lack of practically useful guidance is due in part to the difficulty of determining how to combine the tools of philosophy and psychology to develop a plausible account of wisdom as a prescriptive ideal. Modeling wisdom on more ordinary forms of expertise is promising, but skill models of wisdom (Annas 2011; De Caro et al. 2018; Swartwood (...) 2013b; Tsai 2023) have been challenged on the grounds that there are important differences between wisdom and expert skills (Hacker-Wright 2015, p. 986; Kristjánsson 2015, pp. 98, 101; Stichter 2015, 2016, 2018). I’ll argue that we can both vindicate the promise of skill models of wisdom and begin to specify practically useful strategies for wisdom development by attending to a reflective process that I call Case-Based Critical Reflection. I begin by demonstrating the process as it arose in a notable example from everyday life, illustrating how the process can be usefully applied to a case study of interest to wisdom scientists, and explaining its philosophical pedigree. After isolating the key features that make it relevant to wisdom development, I argue that attending to the importance of Critical Reflection can defuse prominent objections to skill models of wisdom. (shrink)

Interactive theorem provers might seem particularly impractical in the history of philosophy. Journal articles in this discipline are generally not formalized. Interactive theorem provers involve a learning curve for which the payoffs might seem minimal. In this article I argue that interactive theorem provers have already demonstrated their potential as a useful tool for historians of philosophy; I do this by highlighting examples of work where this has already been done. Further, I argue that interactive theorem provers can continue to (...) be useful tools for historians of philosophy in the future; this claim is defended through a more conceptual analysis of what historians of philosophy do that identifies argument reconstruction as a core activity of such practitioners. It is then shown that interactive theorem provers can assist in this core practice by a description of what interactive theorem provers are and can do. If this is right, then computer verification for historians of philosophy is in the offing. (shrink)

There is a history of thinking that photographs provide a special kind of access to the objects depicted in them, beyond the access that would be provided by a painting or drawing. What is included in the photograph does not depend on the photographer’s beliefs about what is in front of the camera. This feature leads Kendall Walton to argue that photographs literally allow us to see the objects which appear in them. Current generative algorithms produce images in response to (...) users’ text prompts. Depending on the parameters, the output can resemble specific people or things which are named in the prompt. This resemblance does not depend on the user’s beliefs, so generated images are in this sense like photographs. Given this parallel, how should we think about AI-generated images? (shrink)

In this paper we distinguish two issues that are often run together in discussions about physicalism. The first issue concerns levels. How do entities picked out by non-physical terminology, such as biological or psychological terminology, relate to physical entities? Are the former identical to, or metaphysically supervenient on, the latter? The second issue concerns physical parts and wholes. How do macroscopic physical entities relate to their microscopic parts? Are the former generally determined by the latter? We argue that views on (...) these two issues are independent of one another and should not be conflated. (shrink)

I defend the continuing importance, and attraction of, moral saints. The objective of this paper is twofold; firstly, to critique Wolf’s definition of sainthood, and secondly, to argue against her view that one should not desire to be a moral saint, nor emulate them. In section 1, I argue that moral saints are highly complex moral agents, and that Wolf’s definition does not capture this complexity. My second argument is that Wolf’s account that there are two kinds of saints, loving (...) and rational, leads to a tension. Either: (1) the distinction between loving and rational saints is justifiable; but then argu- ments against the benefits of sainthood ought to be directed independently against each kind of saint which, Wolf does not do; or (2) the distinction is not justifiable, in which case the division is explanatorily impotent. In section 2, I will present Wolf’s argument for why one should not want to be a moral saint, nor even know one. I counter that Wolf over-emphasises non-moral values, to the point that these values have a monopoly on what constitutes a well-rounded life. Wolf must provide a more definitive scope for non-moral values, as the distinction between moral and non-moral values is ambiguous. Finally, I argue that moral saints can serve as moral exemplars and visionaries. By admir- ing and emulating them, we can adapt our own moral behavior, and by example, moral saints can discover new and better ways of pursuing moral goods. (shrink)

This unpublished paper, written in 2005 in the PhD philosophy program at Notre Dame, argues that algebraic structural realism faces a potentially fatal difficulty raised by the existence of inequivalent representations in quantum field theory.

Cover songs are a familiar feature of contemporary popular music. Musicians describe their own performances as covers, and audiences use the category to organize their listening and appreciation. However, until now philosophers have not had much to say about them. This book explores how to think about covers, appreciating covers, and the metaphysics of covers and songs. Along the way, it explores a range of issues raised by covers, from the question of what precisely constitutes a cover, to the history (...) and taxonomy of the category, the various relationships that hold between songs, performances, and tracks, and the appreciation and evaluation of covers. (shrink)

How does one formalize the structure of structures necessary for the foundations of physics? This work is an attempt at conceptualizing the metaphysics of pregeometric structures, upon which new and existing notions of quantum geometry may find a foundation. We discuss the philosophy of pregeometric structures due to Wheeler, Leibniz as well as modern manifestations in topos theory. We draw attention to evidence suggesting that the framework of formal language, in particular, homotopy type theory, provides the conceptual building blocks for (...) a theory of pregeometry. This work is largely a synthesis of ideas that serve as a precursor for conceptualizing the notion of space in physical theories. In particular, the approach we espouse is based on a constructivist philosophy, wherein ``structureless structures'' are syntactic types realizing formal proofs and programs. Spaces and algebras relevant to physical theories are modeled as type-theoretic routines constructed from compositional rules of a formal language. This offers the remarkable possibility of taxonomizing distinct notions of geometry using a common theoretical framework. In particular, this perspective addresses the crucial issue of how spatiality may be realized in models that link formal computation to physics, such as the Wolfram model. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche and Albert Schweitzer end up defending radically similar, yet critically opposed conclusions about the human animal and its place in nature, particularly with regard to the ethical awareness that does or does not follow from this situatedness. Arthur Schopenhauer’s notion of the will accounts for their similar foundational assumptions. But what accounts for the fact that their shared desire to affirm the will to life leads to fundamentally opposed ethical conclusions? What keeps Schweitzer’s ascetic ethic of reverence for (...) life from evolving into Nietzsche’s anti-ascetic vision of a second innocence beyond good and evil? We argue that situating the notion of reverence for life within an environmental virtue ethics, as one environmental virtue among many, aiming at ecological conversion, better articulates and motivates the disposition demanded by the ethics of reverence for life. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that David Lewis’s possible world semantics for counterfactual discourse and for fictional discourse are apparently inconsistent and in need of revision. The problem emerges for Lewis’s account once one considers how to evaluate ambifictional counterfactuals. Since this is likely not a concept familiar to most, and since it does not appear that the problem has been previously recognized in the critical literature, I will begin by rehearsing Lewis’s possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals and fiction. Then (...) I will explicate the distinction between intrafictional, extrafictional, interfictional, and ambifictional propositions. Next, I will state what an ambifictional counterfactual proposition is, and explain why this kind of discourse confounds Lewis’s system. I will conclude, finally, with a brief discussion of how the Lewisian would be best advised to resolve the paradox. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes often includes powers and abilities in his descriptions of the world. Meanwhile, Hobbes’s philosophical picture of the world appears quite reductive, and he seems sometimes to say that nothing exists but bodies in motion. In more extreme versions of such a picture, there would be no room for powers. Hobbes is not an eliminativist about powers, but his view does tend toward ontological minimalism. It would be good to have an account of what Hobbes thinks powers are, and (...) how they fit into his understanding of the world. In this chapter, I investigate Hobbes’s account of the metaphysics of powers and abilities. Section 1 considers three important aspects of Hobbes’s account of powers: the connection between powers and causes; the modal aspects of powers; and the connection between powers and motions. Sections 2 and 3 then consider interpretive arguments about whether Hobbes identifies powers with underlying corporeal features. (shrink)

Inspired by the early Wittgenstein’s concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we define two different, yet complementary, types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is initially defined within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense, by its turn, is formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and his collaborators. While an expression will (...) be considered formally nonsensical if the formal criteria required for the assignment of any truth-value (whether true, false, pragmatically true, or pragmatically false) to such sentence are not met, a (well-formed) formula will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the pragmatic criteria (inscribed within the context of scientific practice) required for the assignment of any truth-value to such sentence are not met. Thus, in the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, any (well-formed) formula of a formal language interpreted on a simple pragmatic structure will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the set of primary sentences of such structure is not well-built, that is, if it does not include the relevant observational data and/or theoretical results, or if it does include sentences that are inconsistent with such data. (shrink)